Dream Report Pronouns, Local Binding, and Attitudes De Se

An Asymmetry: Lakoff's (1972) first discussed how co-referential pronouns may show *de se* and non-*de se* uses in dream report contexts (1a). Recently, Percus and Sauerland (2002) demonstrated that the pronouns' modes of presentation are unambiguous (1b), but only subject to a c-command relation between the two (2b). The two proposals on the market, a superiority approach due to P&S and a centering-theoretic approach due to Hardt (2003), both invoke movement to account for the contrast in (1-2), despite any syntactic evidence. In addition, they suffer empirical shortcomings: the superiority theory overgenerates (even predicting (1a) to be ambiguous), while the centering theory predicts unattested restrictions on the ambiguity in (2). I demonstrate that the correct generalization for the contrast in (1-2) is that **all *de se* pronouns must be *de re*-free** (*contra* P&S), a fact which I argue follows from local binding (Fox, 2000), once we make it insensitive to the contributions of *de se* interpretation.

De Re Blocking: P&S see in the above contrast the signature of *superiority* – specifically, that the *de re* counterpart intervenes in a probe-goal relation between a head at the root of the CP and the *de se* counterpart, which must move to the probe to create a licit LF for *de se*, in line with Chierchia (1989) (3a). Importantly, this proposal derives the constraint that only the **highest** *de se* pronoun must be *de re* free, which should in turn render (1) as ambiguous as (2), given that the *de se* pronoun in the first conjunct is *de re* free (3b). Similar examples are straightforward to generate (4-5); the same generalization holds of Yoruba logophors, which Adesola (2005) showed to be sensitive to *de re* c-commanders (6). The descriptive characterization of the data, which a superiority constraint cannot straightforwardly derive, is the following:

> *De Re* BLOCKING EFFECT
> No *de se* element can be c-commanded by a *de re* counterpart.

Truth-Conditional Obviation: Hardt (2003) sees in P&S's puzzle a commonality with the multiple pronoun puzzle of Dahl (1973) (i.e., *John₁ said he₁ saw his₁ mother. Bill did too ⟨say he*₁,₂ saw his₂ mother⟩*.) Following Centering Theory (Grosz et al., 1995), Hardt proposes that sloppy/*de se* readings indicate shifting of the *center*, a referential index C marking the most discourse-prominent individual. *De re*/strict readings are the product of movement out of the center-shifted domain by an XP containing the pronoun (7). While Hardt's system correctly derives the De Re Blocking Effect, it introduces movement that shows no additional interpretive effects, e.g. sensitivity to scope-trapping by a quantifier (8a) or NPI-idiom (8b) (here, ellipsis for simplicity). More seriously, it is unclear how this system derives Fox's (2000) truth-conditional obviation effect for Dahl's puzzle (9a), a loophole which exists for the De Re Blocking Effect as well (9b).

Proposal: I propose that the De Re Blocking Effect is simply the result of binding competition between the more local *de re* pronoun and a long-distance *de se* operator (Chierchia, 1989) (10). However, why should these two binding representations compete, given that they are truth-conditionally distinct? I propose that for binding competition they aren't truth-conditionally distinct, given that they are **counterparts of the same individual in the actual world**. Formally, this is captured by evaluating local binding with respect to models where the counterpart relation is a function (11). Assuming generic *you* is bound by a generic operator, this proposal additionally captures the fact that indexical *you* and generic *you* show the contrast in (1-2) (Malamud 2005). Other attitude contexts do not show the De Re Blocking Effect (12), leading one to ask what they have that *dream* lacks. I propose that the difference lies with impositions the predicates place

on *de re* ascription relations: *dream* prohibits pronouns in its scope from being read *de re* via a *de se* description, an anti-logophoricity property shared with shifted indexicals in Amharic (Schlenker, 2003) and Navajo (Speas, 1999), *O*-series pronouns in Abe (Koopman and Sportiche, 1989), and pronouns in Romance subjunctive environments (Schlenker 2005). As predicted (unlike a competition story (Schlenker, 2003)), this prohibition occurs even with a split *de se/de re* quantificational antecedent (13).

(1)   a.   I dreamt I was Brigitte Bardot and I   kissed   me. (Lakoff, 1972)

        b.   I dreamt {Brigitte kissed me, #I kissed Brigitte}

(2)   a.   I dreamt I was Brigitte Bardot and my mother was kissing me.

        b.   I dreamt {Brigitte's mother kissed me, my mother kissed Brigitte}

(3)   a.   I dreamt [PROBE I_{dere} kissed me_i]

        b.   I dreamt [$PROBE_i$ I_i was B.B. and I_{dere} kissed me_i]

(4)   I dreamed that I was Brigitte Bardot and I_{ds} placed {#me, my mother} next to me_{ds} at the dinner table.

(5)   Going through a messy divorce with an uncooperative politician, I consider smearing her anonymously. That night, I dream that am I my wife, and that I hear rumors about my PR campaign.

     I dreamed that before I_{ds} could even get to a reporter, {#**I**, my contacts} had already spread all sorts of lies about me_{ds} all over the internet.

(6) $John_i$ gbàgbó pé   bàbá $òun_i$ fún $un_{*i/j}$ `ìwé oun_i Yoruba
     John   believe   that father LOG-gen give he.acc book LOG.gen

     '$John_i$ believed that his_i father gave $him_{*i,j}$ his_i book.'

(7) I_C [my_C $mother]_3$ $dreamt^{x_{dese} \mapsto C}$ I_C was B.B. and t_3 kissed me_C.

(8)   a. $Mary_1$ said that [every $lobbyist]_2$ thought that the article $they_{1+2}$ wrote praised her_1 too much. $John_3$ did too ⟨say that [every $lobbyist]_2$ thought that the article $they_{1+2}$ wrote praised him_3 too much⟩.

        b. $John_1$ doubted that his_1 mother gave him_1 the time of day.
           $Bill_2$ did too ⟨doubt that his_1 mother gave him_2 the time of day⟩.

(9)   a.   John believes that only he likes his mother. Bill does too ⟨believe that only John likes Bill's mother⟩.

        b.   John, and two friends compete for Mary's affection. One night, John dreams he is Mary and that the three boys must guess her favorite color. Only John guesses correctly.

       John dreamed that only he_{dere} guessed his_{dese} favorite color.

(10)   I dreamt [OP_i I_i was B.B. and I_{dere} kissed me_i]

(11)   **Rule H-mod *de se***: A variable, x, cannot be bound by antecedent, α, in cases where a more local antecedent, β, could bind x and yield the same semantic interpretation within any model $M \in \Xi$. (after Fox 2000)
     $M \in \Xi$ iff $\forall x, y, z \in D_e \forall w \in D_s[(xL_wy \land xL_wz) \rightarrow y = z]$

(12)   John comes late one night, drunk and without his keys. Undeterred, he smashes through a back window and goes up to bed. By the morning, he has forgotten everything, and is shocked to see the window in pieces. Fearing that he is being robbed, he runs upstairs to check his safe.

     John hoped that he_{dere} hadn't yet found his_{dese} safe.

(13)   John dreams he is George, the new President-elect. Bill dreams that he is a staffer on Bill's successful Presidential campaign.

     #[Both John and $Bill]_i$ dreamed that $they_i$ were voted President.